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Abstract
This article explores the lights of Iraq, Iraq's variety of capitalism (VoC) and its system of public
and fiscal governance. The first section examines Iraq's VoC, which I define oil-led state-captured
capitalism with  associated  oil-led  state-captured  war-fare  regime.  In  formerly  ISIS-occupied
territories,  war developments  turned the system into an Insurgent  ISIS-captured capitalism with
associated  Insurgent  ISIS-captured  war-fare  regime.  The  second  section investigates  electricity
usage.  The  nighttime  lights  analysis  is based  on  near  real-time  big  data.  It  includes  high-
resolution remote-sensing and satellite imagery from the NASA Earth Observatory. I use the Visible
Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) sensor on the Suomi NPP satellite. Data on greenhouse
gases are obtained through the AQUA and TERRA satellites derived from the Atmospheric Infrared
Sounder (AIRS) and Moderate-resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS) sensors. I also use
the AURA satellite with the Ozone Monitoring Instrument (OMI) sensor, as well as the  TERRA
satellite with the Measurements of Pollution in the Troposphere (MOPITT) sensor. The third part
discusses the repercussions of electricity usage for good governance, for good regulatory and for
good fiscal practices, as well as for development and growth. The concluding part briefly discusses
the “taxman approach” and the introduction of a new fiscal contract necessary to resolve negative
incentives in oil-led war economies.
KEYWORDS:  Iraq,  political  economy,  ISIS,  geo-spatial  analysis,  night  lights,  remote-sensing,
satellite imagery, public governance, fiscal governance,  oil-led state-captured capitalism, oil-led
state-captured war-fare regime, state capture, policy capture.
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Introduction
Since the advent of the Saddam Hussein regime and, subsequent, first Gulf War of 1980-1988, Iraq
underwent a difficult transition to democracy which has been characterized by the emergence of
civil  conflicts and system instability.  The second Gulf War in 1991, the international economic
sanctions during the period 1991–2003, and the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003 did not
succeed  to  resolve  the  internal  problems,  but  have  often  exacerbated  pre-existing  ethnic  and
religious tensions. This has resulted in an increasing number of casualties, which, from 2003 to
2011,  have  amounted  to  (publicly displayed)  no  less  than  400,000 individuals  and 4.5  million
orphans (MIT 2018)1. However, the real number of deaths is estimated to be much higher than the
one reported by official statistics. Same considerations apply to the number of violent attacks which
have increased significantly since the beginning of the conflict.
In 2018, Iraq had an estimated population of approximately 39 million inhabitants. About
75-80 percent Arabs, and the remaining 15-20 percent of Kurdish Turkoman and Assyrian origins.
The Kurdish minority lives for the most part in northeastern Iraq (Kurdistan Regional Government,
henceforth  KRG).  Islam is  the  official  religion  and  accounts  for  almost  95-98  percent  of  the
population. Shia Muslims correspond to 64-69 percent of the total population, while Sunni Muslims
to approximately 29-34 percent. The remaining population is made of Christians (about 1 percent),
Hindus, Buddhists, Jewish, and people not affiliated to the above mentioned religions2.
Electoral  engineering (Sartori  1994)  has been key for  the Iraqi  transition to democracy,
whose main goal has been to reduce the power of the Shiite majority, expanding the representation
of the Sunnis. The intended consequence, most clearly expressed in the Iraq Study Group report of
2006  and  in  the  18  benchmarks  of  2007,  was  to  speeding  up  the  de-baathification  process.
Simultaneously, it was supposed to limit the incentives for violence and sectarian conflict (Haggard
and Long 2007, p. 2).
In order to bring democracy back to the table after decades of authoritarian subjugation,
attempts  at  creating a  more representative territorial  structure have been made by national  and
international authorities. A proportional system of electoral representation was introduced after the
fall of the Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003. As a consequence, since the first elections in 2005,
several different lists of independent candidates (almost 36 in the elections of 2014) have emerged.
The first free elections have been held in 2005 and have seen the victory of President Jalal Talabani
1 MIT (2018), Iraq: The Human Cost of War. http://web.mit.edu/humancostiraq/ (accessed 19 May
2018). 
2 CIA World Factbook (2018)  
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html (accessed 19 May 2018). 
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and of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki (6 April 2005). Both have been re-elected in the polls of May
20, 2006. Mr Talabani, of Kurdish origin, represented, for the first phase of transition, the most
prominent figure of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Mr al-Maliki represented, instead, the leading
figure of the Shia leading coalition ‘State of Law’. In the elections of 2014, Mr al-Maliki was re-
elected as Prime Minister but was replaced in 2016 by a Shiite politician Haider al-Abadi3. Mr Fuad
Masum, also of Kurdish origins, became instead the new President (Al-Jazeera 2014; Wikipedia
2015). In the national elections of 2018, 87 parties and 6,990 candidates tried to acquire a seat in the
Iraq's parliament (Ibrahim 2018a,b).  This was the result of political fragmentation caused by the
subsequent  waves  of  war.  Shia  leader  Muqtada  al-Sadr  of  the  Sairoon  Alliance  won  the
parliamentary elections with 54 seats.  Shia militia chief Hadi al-Amiri of Fatah (Conquest) Bloc
obtained 47 seats. Former Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi of Nasr (Victory) Coalition obtained 42
seats  (Al-Jazeera  2018;  The  Baghdad  Post  2018a). Elections'  results  were  soon  subjected  to
disputes.
Close to the announced defeat of ISIS (Mansour 2017) and the unity of all Iraqis 4, the fight
against corruption (داسف [fasad]) became one of the main mobilization strategies of the 2018 national
elections,  and also the main keyword for  identity politics  (Shia,  Sunni,  Kurds,  etc.),  civicness,
public  authority,  as  well  as  for  the  associated  economic  and material  incentives  of  public
governance (IRIS 2018). Here, it is important to note that the fight against “The Corrupt” (نيدسافلا
[al-fāsideen]), seen as bad as ISIS (Mansour 2017), also includes religious normative connotations,
such as those concerned with religious “immorality” (روجف [fajur]) and moral decay (يقلخلا للحنلا
[alanhalal alakhlaki]), and not simply refers to the “corruptible” (داسفلاو  ةوشرلل  لباق [qabil lilrashwat
walfasad]), “purchasable” (ءارشلل [lilshira']), “dishonest” (نيمأ ريغ [ghyr 'amin], etc. individual.
In the light of a persistent electoral fragmentation of the political spectrum, Haggard and
Long  (2007,  p.  3)  have  identified  in  the  ‘engineer’s  dilemma’ a  critical  situation  for  future
stabilization and consolidation attempts in Iraq. The ‘engineer’s dilemma’ refers, in this case, to a
situation where the presumed institutional change aimed at enlarging the representation of the Sunni
minority has ended up in an unexpected increase of violence.  Among the problems of political
inclusion associated with this failure in constitutional and electoral engineering, the authors mention
‘the fragmentation of the combatants, their weak representation in the formal political process, and
3Washington Post (2014),  Iraqi  president  names Haider al-Abadi new prime minister,  defying al-Maliki.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/iraqs-political-situation-dire-as-maliki-digs-in/2014/08/11/1c70942a-
213a-11e4-958c-268a320a60ce_story.html (accessed 19 May 2018). 
4 On a tweet on May 2018, the Shia leader Muqtada al-Sadr stated: “Iraqi people are twins in faith 
and brothers in Islam, nation and life [...] No more Kurdish demand for secession, no more Sunni
calls for revenge and no more Shiite fighting. Unity, tolerance and peace are our target” (The 
Baghdad Post 2018b).
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the presence of extremists and the associated process of outbidding’ (Haggard and Long 2007, p. 3).
The fiscal and federal structure, which continues to favor the two major allies (Shia and Kurds),
also played a dominant role in reducing the prospects for peace and stability. Interestingly, always
according to the authors (see Haggard and Long 2007, p. 8), these problems of ‘engineering’ have
contributed to exacerbate the demands of radical nationalists to re-establish a Sunni hegemony, and
increasing the jihadists’ requests for an Islamic ‘caliphate’. 
An additional important and often neglected issue of Iraq's political system concerns the
increasing autonomy of the Kurdistan National Assembly, which also thanks to the number of seats
(111) and the relative power of the Kurdish minority, makes it de facto an autonomous regional state
or, in other words, a ‘state within a state’ (UNPO 2013). This has clear repercussions not only for
Iraq’s future national unity and long-term stability, but also for future redistributive attempts. The
territorial distribution of natural resources in the contemporary federal structure continues to favor
existing winning coalitions, not avoiding the creation of insider-outsider divides. The limits of such
a constructed ‘consociational democracy’, aptly highlighted by Lijphardt (1999), have become in
this way more apparent (Haggard and Long 2007, p. 12). This can also be seen in the formulation of
the new constitution, which, adopted by a referendum on 15 October 2005 (amended in 2013), has
established a mixed legal system of civil and Islamic law, still subjected to multiple interpretations 5.
The challenge for  the international  community at  large is,  therefore,  to  establish new forms of
‘culturally sensitive capitalism’,  able  to  integrate  and to  pacify different  hostile  factions  of the
society.  The  number  of  firms  must  increase,  but  also  the  human  security  and  the  economic
integration of the affected population must do. In order to achieve these objectives, there is a need
for a new political economy with new redistributive and fiscal priorities.
This article explores the lights of Iraq, Iraq's variety of capitalism (VoC) and its system of
public and fiscal governance. The first section examines Iraq's VoC, which I define  oil-led state-
captured  capitalism with  associated  oil-led  state-captured  war-fare  regime.  In  formerly  ISIS-
occupied  territories,  war  developments  turned the  system  into  an Insurgent  ISIS-captured
capitalism  with  associated  Insurgent  ISIS-captured  war-fare  regime.  The  second
section investigates electricity usage. The nighttime lights analysis is based on near real-time big
data.  It  includes  high-resolution remote-sensing  and  satellite  imagery  from  the  NASA Earth
Observatory. I use the Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) sensor on the Suomi NPP
satellite. Data on greenhouse gases are obtained through the AQUA and TERRA satellites derived
5According to the Arab Barometer for Iraq (2012, p.5), about 72 percent of respondents agree that
‘religious practices should be kept as a private matter and separated from public life’, 85 percent
that ‘religious leaders should not interfere in voters’ decisions’, whilst only 31 percent that ‘Islamic
law was appropriate for their country’.
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from  the  Atmospheric  Infrared  Sounder  (AIRS)  and  Moderate-resolution  Imaging
Spectroradiometer (MODIS) sensors.  I also use the AURA satellite with the Ozone Monitoring
Instrument (OMI) sensor,  as well as the TERRA satellite with the Measurements of Pollution in the
Troposphere (MOPITT) sensor. The third part discusses the repercussions of electricity usage for
good governance, for good regulatory and for good fiscal practices, as well as for development and
growth. The concluding part briefly discusses the “taxman approach” and the introduction of a new
fiscal contract necessary to resolve negative incentives in oil-led war economies.
The Political Economy in Iraq 
Iraq’s main development model remains heavily based on oil revenues and state transfers, which
take the form of public subsidies, employment in the public sector and transfers to state-owned
enterprises (World Bank 2014). Iraq's variety of capitalism (see Hall and Soskice 2001) can be
described as an oil-led state-captured capitalism, subjected to well-known distributive “resource
curse” problems (Ross 2012), including a resource predation and a resource-seeking foreign direct
investment  dependence  mechanism (Stevens et  al.  2015). I  describe this:  oil-led state-captured
capitalism with  associated  oil-led  state-captured  war-fare  regime (see  Esping-Andersen  1990;
Gough  et  al.  2004; Cerami  and  Stubbs  2013).  In  formerly  ISIS-occupied  territories,  war
developments  turned  the  system  into  an  Insurgent  ISIS-captured  capitalism  with  associated
Insurgent ISIS-captured war-fare regime. 
In 2012, the total budget revenues at disposal of the government corresponded to 102,327
billion Iraqi Dinars (ID), among which 94,378 billion ID came from oil revenues and 2,840 ID
billion from taxes6. Individuals paid a very small amount of taxes, as the majority of state revenues
and public  services was financed through oil  (World Bank 2014, Table 2.1,  p.20).  In 2016, oil
revenues accounted to more than 90 percent of total revenues, whilst taxes amounted to only 2
percent. Income tax, corporate income tax, taxes on goods and services, property taxes and taxes on
international trade were below the MENA region of 10 percent and an international comparator
average of 15 percent (Feher et al. 2017, p. 16-19). In absence of a clear involvement of citizens in
financing their own state and system of public governance, electoral requests become easily a gift of
the political elites to ‘their’ citizens (Diamond 2008). In 2017, because of the economic recession
following the protracted reduction in oil and gas prices, of war-fare related activities, as well as of
ongoing political contestation and civil conflicts due to the ISIS presence (OECD 2016a), Iraq's
GDP corresponded to 230.7 trillion IQDs (-0.8 percent in comparison to the previous year),  of
6 In June 2012, 1 USD corresponded to 1166 Iraqi dinars.
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which oil GDP was equal to 87.3 trillion IQDs (-3.5 percent) and non-oil GDP to 143.4 trillion
IQDs (4.4 percent) (World Bank 2018, Table 56, p. 128)7. 
In 2018, ten main transmission mechanisms of economic and fiscal crises could be identified
in Iraq: (i) trade shocks; (ii) oil prices and oil price cycles shocks; (iii) exchange rate shocks; (iv)
banking sector risks; (v) foreign direct investments shocks; and (vi) debt refinincing squeeze (that is
- dependency on foreign financial markets for debt refinancing; see Stubbs et al. 2009). In addition,
(vii)  corruption,  (viii)  “oil  resource  curse”,  (ix)  state-capture  and  (x)  policy-capture  (OECD
2017a,b)8 related mechanisms also played a crucial role in the transmission of economic and fiscal
crises. 
War-fare amenities with associated damages (see World Bank 2018) also continue to create
significant  macro-  and  micro-  economic  vulnerabilities.  They  also  alter  the  main  sources  of
financing  for  public  expenditures,  subsequently,  reducing  the  fiscal  space  available  for  public
policies.  Furthermore,  they  also  exacerbate  the  problems  associated  with  the  international
competitiveness of Iraq. 
The Political Economy of War in Formerly ISIS-occupied Territories
In  formerly  ISIS-occupied  territories9,  almost  one-third  of  Iraq  (Mansour  2017),  close  to  war-
making activities, ISIS established a “war economy” based on resource predation. As introduced by
Eaton (2018, p. 5), “the term ‘war economy’ encompasses economic activities dependent – directly
or  indirectly – on the  dispensation  or  perpetuation  of  violence”  put  in  place  by  war economy
profiteers. This includes war-making income-generating activities, among which the acquisition of
state  assets  of  captured  cities,  smuggling  (including  the  sale  of  commodities,  goods,  services,
humans and parts of humans), extortion, taxation, and rents (e.g. land rents) (Eaton 2018). In 2017,
the  main  sources  of  financing  the  ISIS  state  and  war-fare  regime  included  oil,  natural  gas,
phosphate,  cement,  agriculture,  revenues  of  criminal  origin,  extortion,  kidnap  and  ransom,
antiquities trafficking and donations (Swanson 2015; CAT 2016), which were redistributed among
7 In 2017, 1 USD corresponded to 1,171 Iraqi dinars. 
8 The term “state capture”, derived from the concept of “regulatory capture”, refers to the ways in
which  private  individuals  capture  state  bureacracies  (including  formal  and  informal  norms)  to
manipulate public policy-making, including their ideas, interests and institutions (see Hall 1993),
for their private interest  (World Bank 2000, p. 3). The term  “policy capture” refers, instead,  to
“public decisions over policies [that] are consistently or repeatedly directed away from the public
interest towards a specific interest” (OECD 2017b, p. 1).
9 For  recent  maps,  see  2016  ISIS-occupied  territories  available  here,
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/10/this-map-shows-how-much-territory-isis-has-lost-in-
2016/ and 2017 map available here  https://dailybrief.oxan.com/Analysis/GA224615/Islamic-State-
will-prepare-for-the-next-phase (accessed 19 May 2018). 
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the  population  to  acquire  legitimacy  and  support  (Almukhtar  2015;  Callimachi  2018).  This
“caliphate-building” activity also implied the creation of its own ISIS currency (Milliken 2015). 
In June 2014, ISIS’s estimated assets in Iraq corresponded to no less than $875 million. Its
major revenue sources were given by extortion and taxation activities in the Iraqi territory, which
were estimated at $600 million. In addition, $500 million were stolen from state-owned banks, $100
million from oil whose barrels were sold at half of the official price. $20 million were raised by
kidnapping ransoms (Almukhtar 2015). 
In  2015,  ISIS  expanded  increasing  its  “public  policy  investment”  in  people,  paying  its
20,000-30,000 fighters  between $350 and $1500 per  month  according to  their  rank,  skills  and
nationality (FATF 2015, pp. 29-30). Similar estimations made by Lister (2015) stated that there
were approximately 30,000 ISIS armed members in early 2015, and about  a half  of these were
foreigners  of  not  Iraqi  or  Syrian  origin. The  ISIS  total  assets,  presumably  including  also  the
occupied territories in Syria, should have, in reality,  corresponded to $2 billion, with an annual
revenue of $200 million to $300 million (Waterbury 2015). 
In 2016, ISIS oil revenues were estimated to range from $250 million per year to nearly
$365 million per  year.  However,  these numbers declined due to the airstrikes on tanks  and oil
refineries (Jones et al 2017, p.8)10. Between 2016 and 2017, ISIS money for funding the ISIS war-
fare regime also came from stealing and redistributing credit cards, social security benefits, small
loans, scooters, or even selling organs of dead fighters (for more information on such disgusting
business, see also FATF 2017; May 2017). As in other countries, selling weapons was also used as a
corruption mechanism (see Enough Project 2017), which was then re-employed for increasing the
performance of the ISIS war-fare state. 
At the end of 2017, daily commerce and agriculture (worth hundreds of million of dollars)
rather than external donor or oil sales represented the main sources of funding for the ISIS new tax
revenue  regime  (Callimachi  2018).  Between  2014  and  2017,  ISIS  established  at  least  14  new
administrative offices named “diwan” (including education,  health, etc.)  (Callimachi 2018). The
term diwan stems from the Sultan of Sulu Sharif ul-Hashim's (who lived approximately in 1405)
system of laws based on Quran11. The  diwans  established by Sharif ul-Hashim can therefore be
understood  as  the  administrative  and  bureacratic  expressions  of  a  Quran's  interpretation  of  a
10 Up-to-date information on ISIS financing mechanisms, including wage salaries, is provided by
Jones et al. (2017).
11 The original name of  Sharif  ul-Hashim was Sayyed walShareef Abubakar Abirin AlHashmi,
which shows that he was supposed to be a direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad.
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caliphate tax financing system. In ISIS-occupied territories, local administrators are understood not
as the owners of the land, but their protectors (Maulana, e.g. the Sultan) – and their administrators
(the Sheiks).
Hence, the distrinction between direct and indirect taxation in “Islamic State” territories is,
to some extent, misleading, since taxes should rather be seen as “religious endowments” paid for
the individuals'  benefiting  of  goods and services.  In  the  new “tax farming” system12,  taxes,  or
“religious endowments” are important steering mechanisms13. They aim to change the behavior of
people and become functional to the establishment and maintenance of a “state/caliphate”14. 
Tax-steering  or  religious  endowment-steering  became,  in  this  case,  an  important  social
mechanism  of  consonance-driven  desire  formation (Hedström  1998)  with ‘environmental’,
‘cognitive’, as well as ‘relational’ repercussions (see MacAdam et al. 2001). Religious endowments
have an impact on the closest surrounding conditions that affect the lives of individuals, as well as
their  psychological and behavioural patterns,  with associated connections among people, groups
and  interpersonal  networks  (see  also  Mayntz  2003).  This,  consequently,  may  lead  to  social
mechanisms of anger mobilization and contagion in collective action.
These religious “taxes” involved, for example, financing public and social security services,
such as taxes for garbage collection, VAT, tariffs for trade, electricity, sanitation, fees for social
security services, tax subventions (such as for the sheep milk) or tax deductions, taxes from oil
extraction, land taxes and  poll taxes, taxes on accessing the labour market, payroll taxes, personal
income tax, property usage contracts and associated taxes (e.g. concession tax), withholding taxes,
price subsidies, custom duties, and landholder taxes. In formerly ISIS-occupied territories, even bus
tickets  were  part  of  the  overall  tax  financing  system  regime,  since  they  helped  to  fund  the
functioning of municipal local social security services15. 
The System of Public Governance in Iraq
The system of public governance in Iraq depends on oil revenues and on the attachment of citizens
12 On tax-farming in Muslim societies, see Rothstein and Broms (2010) and Cerami (2015).
13 On steering mechanisms see Mayntz (2003).
14 In the bills and receipts it was written “The Islamic State, Caliphate on the path to prophecy”,
see Callimachi Twitter Post (2018a) https://twitter.com/i/moments/983112616146071553 (accessed
19 May 2018). 
15 See Callimachi Twitter Post (2018b) https://twitter.com/i/moments/982358498863407104 
(accessed 19 May 2018). 
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to  the  labour  market  with  a  majority  of  public  sector  employees  or,  when  not  accessible,  on
informal arrangements provided by the members of the family, the tribe or the sect (Shia vs. Sunni).
In order to protect uncovered citizens, the government has established a Public Distribution System
based on state-sponsored fuel subsidies16 and food rations. The implications of this system are, first
of all, high dependence from state-driven labour market performance and state-owned enterprises
with a residual neo-liberal coverage for the non-employed, and, second, dependence on food rations
distributed to approximately 33 million Iraqis (about 90 percent of the population) (El Mekkaoui de
Freitas and Johnson 2012, p.9). The fiscal space for public policies, therefore, greatly depends on
oil revenues, oil prices and oil price cycles and on the state-budget availability of funds (Feher et al.
2017, p.11, 12). 
With regard to public governance and pensions, they rely on the social insurance principle,
which implies that only workers in formal employment have a decent access to retirement. Self-
employed persons, agricultural employees, temporary employees, household workers, and family
labour are excluded from pension entitlements (US Social Security Administration 2016). Due to
the high number of citizens employed in the public sector, near universal coverage aspirations result
in  increasing  state  budget  inadequacies  and low protections  (Feher  et  al.  2017).  This  situation
becomes particularly worrying in the case of disability and survivor pensions, especially in a war-
setting environment, where the presence of, for example, land-mines create an increasing number of
disabled citizens. The public distribution system is set to cover this deficit, but, as mentioned, it is
often subjected to a lack of funds due to the drop in oil prices and adverse oil price cycles.
Similarly, health care governance is based on health social insurance. This would imply that
in absence of state-sponsored provisions only employed persons would have access to heath care
services.  Important  to  note  is  that  subsequent  wars  in  Iraq  have  destroyed  most  of  the  health
facilities  and  this  has  resulted  in  a  lack  of  infrastructures,  medical  equipment,  personnel  and
medicines. As a report by UNOCHA (2015, p. 2) has shown, approximately 20 per cent of the
population (7 million people) cannot access even the most basic health care services, with women
and  children  particularly  vulnerable  to  poverty  related  diseases,  forced  marriage  and  sexual
violence. Public health emergency in Iraq requires the reestablishment of basic medical services,
especially in those areas occupied by armed groups where about 50 percent of health professionals
have fled17.
With regard to governance and protection against unemployment, jobs are mostly provided
16 From 2000 to 2016, oil, gasoline and kerosene prices for Iraqi families dramatically increased,
but energy price subsidies decreased from 7.7 percent of GDP in 2013 to 2.2 percent of GDP in
2016 (IMF 2017).
17http://www.save-iraq.info/download/205/ 
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by the state,  unemployment insurance covers only a small  part  of the population.  Usually,  this
involves those citizens who have worked in state owned enterprises and are attached to national and
local political elites. Interesting to note is that employment protection law dates back to 1964 (with
subsequent amendments) and, therefore, it has been established in a period antecedent to Saddam
Hussein’s rise to power. It is based on the social assistance principle, though highly residual in
scope and coverage (US Social Security Administration 2016).
Finally,  the  governance  of  maternity  and  family  benefits  are  also  based  on  the  social
insurance principle and, thus, covering only a very small part of Iraq's women. In absence of full
and  decent  employment,  women  continue  to  be  seen  as  wives-mothers  rather  than  active
participants in the labour market. This is also, to some extent, represented in the attitudes of Iraq's
population toward women. According to the Arab Barometer for Iraq (2012, p.28), approximately
72 percent of respondents state that ‘men and women should have equal work opportunities’, but 75
percent agreed that “men are better than women at political leadership”.
The Public Governance System in Formerly ISIS-occupied Territories 
Drawing  on  Charles  Tilly’s  (1985)  seminal  work  entitled  War  Making  and  State  Making  as
Organized  Crime,  it  is  possible  to  affirm  that  the  functions  that  several  rebel  and  terrorist
organizations linked to ISIS carry out in their everyday lives (in particular, protective, extractive,
and redistributive) are equivalent to those of a state and, therefore, turn the organization or the rebel
group into something more than a simple loose confederation of organized ‘self-made’ criminals. It
is  not  by  chance  that  their  members,  once  emotionally  and  institutionally  affiliated  to  the
organization, have started to: (1) carry out ‘intelligence’ activities typical of a state, such as those
linked to searching and punishing possible spies within the territory under their control; (2) tax for
the passage from one city to another city of any illicit contraband (e.g. drugs, weapons, laundered
cash and people); (3) collect profits, and protect and control the production areas; (4) recruit and
provide subsistence to the marginalized peoples living in underdeveloped regions; and (5) deliver a
range of public services to the population in need (see also Sanger and Davis 2014; see also the ISIS
Files Callimachi 201818). 
In this process of nation-state building, rentierism has become a complementary mechanism
of public  governance  and state  formation made possible  by the  predation  and redistribution  of
natural resources. This nation-building process has also required a system of propaganda that occurs
mostly  through  social  networks  (Khatib  2015),  as  well  as  the  construction  of  a  Weberian
18 https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/04/04/world/middleeast/isis-documents-mosul-
iraq.html
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bureaucratic structure, necessary to ensure the state fiscal capacity to reduce a ‘state failure’ and
state collapse. In this context, the creation of an ISIS organized rentier state represented a further
impediment to the process of democratization in Iraq,  as it aligned socio-political  norms to the
patrimonial  nature  of  social  interactions  with  associated  more  radical  religiously  dominated
loyalties (Thies 2015). 
In  order  to  increase  its  acceptance  among  the  population,  ISIS  has  also  invested  in
infrastructures  (such  as  building  underground  pipelines,  employing  engineers,  etc.),  in  public
services and in social benefits. It has also made regular payments to the families of members killed
or captured. It has purchased diesel generators for distributing electricity and mobilized existing
infrastructures to provide basic services, or engaging in agricultural production and taxation (FATF
2015,  pp.  29-30).  In  ISIS-occupied  territories,  the  largest  expenditures  in  salaries  estimated
(between $3 million and $10 million every month) were, however, employed for ISIS police-state
institutions, such as committees, media, courts, and market regulation; thus ensuring Tilly’s security
function (see Almukhtar 2015). In the past, the access to public services and distribution of welfare
benefits  has  depended,  for  the  most  part,  on  non-state  and religious  actors  (see  Gellner  1981;
Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan 2003). These tasks are now carried out by ISIS religious leaders. 
As a telling article by Shatz (2015) has demonstrated, the use of public employment in ISIS-
occupied  territories  has  had  the  intended  consequence  of  radicalization  and  social  deviance
reinforcement.  Financing  ISIS  has,  for  example,  been  made  possible  by  ISIS  “government”
subsidies  to  “government”  employees  who  lived  in  ISIS-occupied  territories  (wilaya
or ‘protectorates’) (Khatib 2015). This money estimated, as mentioned, in several hundred million
US$ have not only reinforced the local system of patronage and clientelistic relations. They have
also provided additional support for an involuntarily sponsored ISIS administrative local economy
and local war-fare state, reinforcing the ISIS ‘clear, hold, build’ strategy (Khatib 2015; see also
Callimachi 2018)19. 
The importance of ISIS in changing cultural patterns in the Iraq public administration must
be emphasized. It involves, for example, not only a radicalization and over-secularization of society,
but  also  de-modernization.  The  increasing  number  of  women  who  joined  the  organization  as
fighters (and, in case, martyrs) and built a new family (Saltman and Smith 2015) represents here a
notable example of a new societal structure in the making, with associated emerging social order
and social risks. This has a price also for gender-equality. According to FATF (2015, p. 13), in 2014
ISIS fighters paid for a female slave approximately $13. In 2017, the price had increased between
19 According to FATF (2015, p. 30), ‘energy experts estimate that ISIS can rebuild a single mobile 
refinery in 10 days for 230,000 USD’. 
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$35 or $50 (Jones et al. 2017, p. 11). 
ISIS-leaders had become the new “autocratic Leviathans”20 of Iraq.
The Lights of Iraq21
Geo-spatial micro and macro econometrics based on near real-time big data can help to improve
understanding of current GDP and GDP growth, or "True GDP" Growth and the size of its informal
economy (Medina and Schneider 2018). It can also help to improve understanding of current and
future income growth, presence of roads and infrastructures, wealth of cities, urban versus rural
divides, the effects of diseases on growth (such as malaria), growth at the coast versus the interior,
etc. (see Henderson et al. 2012; Donaldson and Storeygard 2016; Leitzell 2012). 
According to Leitzell (2012), nighttime lights should be understood as a proxy of economic
prosperity and shining. This is defined as  “the condition of being successful or thriving, especially
with reference to economic well-being”22. Investigating how energy consumption behaviors vary
across different cultural settings, Román and Stokes (2015) have succeeded to shed new light on the
cultural patterns according to which cities and “people illuminate the night”23 and their life (such as
during the Christmas and New Year’s season and the Holy Month of Ramadan). The number and
the intensity of lights is, in fact, very often associated with the wealth of a city and of a nation
(think, for example, to Berlin, Paris or New York night lights). Also geo-spatial data cannot be so
easily falsified by governments.  It is,  in fact,  no secret that politicians and dictators can easily
falsify official GDP statistics for political objectives (see also Martinez 2018). 
The  following  analysis  employs  high-resolution,  remote-sensing  and  satellite  imagery
provided by the NASA Earth Observatory24. Remote-sensing satellite imagery are made of millions
of single pixels, which become the smallest units of scientific enquiry. NASA nighttime lights are
derived from the Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS)25 sensor on the SUOMI NPP
satellite26 (for an User Guide see especially,  NOAA 2017).  A special  algorithm is  developed to
remove remaining clouds' and snow's shades. Data on greenhouse gases are obtained thanks to the
20 On the autocratic Leviathan and tax competition, see Genschel et al. (2016, p. 27).
21 A more detailed geo-spatial analysis with interactive graphs and images is available at Story
Maps: Geo-Spatial Analysis Iraq https://arcg.is/1uWXrz
22 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/prosperity (accessed 19 May 2018). 
23 https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/news/seeing-holiday-lights-space (accessed 19 May 2018). 
24 https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/ (accessed 19 May 2018). 
25 https://jointmission.gsfc.nasa.gov/viirs.html (accessed 19 May 2018). 
26 https://jointmission.gsfc.nasa.gov/ (accessed 19 May 2018). 
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AQUA27, AURA28 and TERRA29 satellites and derived from, respectively, the Atmospheric Infrared
Sounder (AIRS), the Ozone Monitoring Instrument (OMI) and the Moderate-resolution Imaging
Spectroradiometer (MODIS) sensors. The validity of the use of multi-satellites screening has been
confirmed by Román et al. (2018).
Using the SUOMI NPP satellite and VIIRS sensor, Román and Stokes (2015, p. 183) have
aslo shown that in the cities of Iraq, war, regional political conflicts and contestation, as well as
civil  conflict  were  determinant  in  changing  energy  service  supply  and  demand.  As  discussed
by Michael Carlowicz (2016), from 2012 to 2016, Iraq faced differential growth and development
phases depending on the previously mentioned economic transmission mechanisms, including those
associated with war-fare amenities. Until 2016, some areas on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and
close to Mosul saw some decrease in electricity usage (and therefore of lights and of prosperity
shining),  while  areas  around  Baghdad,  Irbil  and  Kirkuk  saw  some  more  significant  increases
because of the temporary improvement of the security situation (see Appendix Fig. 1 and Fig. 2).  
Over the period 2017-2018,  prosperity shining decreased in Baghdad and its surrounding
region, in Irbil,  in Mosul and in Kirkuk, as well  as in the Tigris  and Euphrates rivers more in
general (see Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, March 9, 2017 to March 31, 2018). This decrease in electricity usage
was the result of the economic recession following the protracted reduction in oil and gas prices, of
war-fare related activities, as well as of ongoing political contestation and civil conflicts due to the
ISIS presence (OECD 2016a) (see Fig. 3 and Fig. 4). In the Basrah area, the lack of production and
processing of energy, as well as low voltages and frequency were the main causes for electricity
system instability and reduced prosperity shining (The Baghdad Post 2018c).  
Greenhouse gases (water vapor, carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide
and ozone) are responsible for global warming. Both through the slow and fast carbon cycle, they
contribute to environmental insecurity. Water vapor accounts for about 50 percent, clouds for 25
percent, small particles (such as aerosols) and minor greenhouse gases (e.g. methane and carbon
monoxide) account for the rest of temperature anomalies (NASA 2011)30. Greenhouse gases are not
only  responsible  for  global  warming  and  environmental  insecurity31,  but  they  can  also trigger
27 https://aqua.nasa.gov/ (accessed 19 May 2018). 
28 https://aura.gsfc.nasa.gov/ (accessed 19 May 2018). 
29 https://www.earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Features/Terra/ (accessed 19 May 2018). 
30 https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Features/CarbonCycle/?src=features-
hp&eocn=home&eoci=feature_archive&src=share (accessed 19 May 2018). 
31 The  number  of  rare  species  of  breeding  birds  in  the  area  is  an  additional  indicator  of
environmental  quality.  In  Iraq,  there  are  approximately  18  bird  species  at  risk
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asthma attacks,  aggravate breathing difficulties and can cause death from respiratory and heart
diseases (Burgess et al. 2007, p.47). 
Whilst the primary contributor to air,  land and water pollution in Western Europe is the
transport sector, followed by the industry (see Burgess et al. 2007, ch. 3, p. 48), in Iraq oil pollution
and the consequences of war-fare can be seen as main causes for environmental insecurity.  As
portrayed  in  Figures  6-14,  the  oil-led  state-captured  capitalism in  Iraq  creates  not  only  rising
environmental  problems, but  also increases,  to a larger  extent,  the asymmetries between higher
levels  of  economic  development,  higher  levels  of  air,  land  and  water  pollution  and  mounting
pressures in the labour market and in the war-fare regime architecture (including health related
risks)  (see  Gough  2013,  p.  8;  see  also  Gough  2016,  pp.  24-47).  This  implies  implementing
innovative good regulatory practices in order to meet emerging social, economic and environmental
challenges. More specifically,  Fig.  14 shows aggregate levels of  carbon monoxide and nitrogen
oxide, which, as discussed by the NASA Earth Observatory (2018), are both major air pollutants
emitted by cars and by other industrial sources, such as oil and gas plants. The areas of Basrah,
Baghdad,  Kirkuk,  Irbil  and Mosul  are  the  zones  where  air  quality  is  the  poorest.  This  can  be
explained by oil and gas related emissions, as well as by war and conflict related amenities, such as
those related to the fight against ISIS terrorists. 
The  SUOMI  NPP satellite  with  the  VIIRS  sensor  is  also  useful  for  natural  resource
discovery and production (Henderson et al. 2012; Donaldson and Storeygard 2016). Using satellite
multi-spectral imaging and ground-truth pre-war-fare output data, Do et al. (2018) have estimated
that  in  ISIS-occupied  territories  the  terrorist  group  was  able  to  produce  approximately  56,000
barrels  per  day (bpd)  from July-December 2014,  which dropped to 35,000 bpd in 2015, being
further reduced to 16,000 bpd in 2016. Assuming an oil price in the black market of 20-45 USD per
barrel, the daily oil related budget available to ISIS should have corresponded to 320,000 USD and
720,000 USD per day.  Close to  agricultural  revenues (see Callimachi  2018),  these oil  earnings
represented  interesting  sources  of  funding  for  new  ISIS-sponsored  public  policies  and  social
cooptation activities, but they also resulted in new environmental challenges that were particularly
harmful for the occupied population. 
Electricity Usage and Public Governance
(http://chartsbin.com/view/40237).  See  List  of  Birds  in  Iraq
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_birds_of_Iraq)  and  Earth  Endangered  Creatures
(http://www.earthsendangered.com/profile.asp?gr=B&sp=4587) (accessed 19 May 2018). 
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As mentioned (see Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 show), during the period from March 2017 to March 2018,
Baghdad,  and  Iraq  more  in  general,  were  subjected  to  a  decrease  in  electricity  usage  and,
subsequent, prosperity shining. Electricity infrastructural damage reduced the availability of public
services and utilities and, subsequently, reinforced ISIS cooptation capabilities through the delivery
of basic public services. Offices and shops closed. ISIS labour delivery capacity and social bondage
activities increased (Callimachi 2018).  What should not be forgotten here is that ISIS camps are
difficult  to  target.  In  Syria,  for  example,  they  are  located  in  open space  places  with  no  clear
boundaries (Squarcini 2015). Hence, who hits whom is still an open question.   
The reduction in electricity usage has also resulted in a subsequent reduction in human and
economic activity, as well as in the progress and in the socio-technical advancement of the Iraqi
society32. Re-switching the lights on33 has become an important task in order to avoid recession,
increase formal employment (e.g.  through entrepreneurship) and GDP, whilst  reducing informal
economic activites with obvious reduction of official taxes. As mentioned, the Iraqi oil-led political
economy model is now primarily centered on war-fare debt damage consolidation (the war damage
debt refinincing squeeze problem), which has reduced the space for fiscal policies.  
Analyzing  NASA images, a recent BBC (2017) report has demonstrated that in Syria, in
areas where citizens could turn their lights on at night, they also could get access to life-saving
medical equipment and, hence, this had the potential of improving citizens' lives. The decrease in
electricity usage and night  lights in  Iraq  from March 2017 to March 2018,  especially in  ISIS-
occupied territories, has meant that the lives, the access to health facilities, the health and social
security of the citizens living in these places shrunk considerably. Electricity availability and usage
during the period 2017-2018 has played also a determinant role in reducing the access to water and
sanitation facilities, greatly enlarging hygiene's and health risks' factors. 
Despite massive efforts made, the decrease in electricity usage from March 2017 to March
2018 has also meant a decrease in the availability of schools and educational services. Underage
individuals  could  simply  not  go  to  school  because  of  electricty  infrastructural  destruction  or
reduction in energy service supply and demand. Unfortunately, problems of education remain even
more preponderant in ISIS-occupied territories,
Electricity is crucial for keeping public services alive. As electricity usage shrinked from
March 2017 to March 2018, the efficiency of public facilities with associated performance outcome
32 see  OECD  2018  series  Better  Policies  for  Better  Societies available  at
http://www.oecd.org/about/publishing/betterpoliciesseries.htm (accessed 19 May 2018). 
33 https://www.earthobservatory.nasa.gov/IOTD/view.php?id=91431 (accessed 19 May 2018). 
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shrinked. The decrease in electricity usage also includes digital technology divides between war-
fare damaged and the non war-fare damaged zones of Iraq. 
Because of the fall in electricity usage from March 2017 to March 2018, and the subsequent
increase in the informal economy, women's vulnerabilities have also grown. As noted by Karshenas
and Moghadam (2006), women’s participation in the labour market has often and unjustifiably been
seen by the ruling elites as anti-Islamic (see discussion on women as wives-mothers above). Even
when integration in the labour market has occurred, it  has served primarily to reconfigure state
functions and to provide legitimacy to the regime (Krause 2009).  Feminization of poverty has,
hence, been the most obvious result, and this has especially occurred in ISIS-occupied territories.
Electricity plays a determinant role also in the food production chains. Farms, factories and
machines can be shut off, either by destruction or by electricity disruption. As lights decreased in
Iraq  from March  2017  to  March  2018,  food  production  also  decreased.  War  damages  do  not
improve the food and nutrition situation of the Iraqi population (FAO 2017). In 2018, 2.4 million
Iraqis are still in need of food security assistance (FAO 2018)34, whilst the country continues to be
highly dependent on commercial food imports (Devereux 2017).
Co-optation – broadly understood as the capacity of the ruling elite to bind strategic actors
via formal and informal institutions (Merkel and Gerschewski 2011) has shifted also toward ISIS-
leaders  as  new  co-opters  (or  war  economy  profiteers,  see  Eaton  2018),  who  have  aimed  at
substituting egalitarian  policy participation by ensuring the inclusion of strategically important
radical parts of the population into the economy and into its ultra-confessional politics. 
In  order  to  increase  the  electoral  turn-out,  many  parties  started  to  increment  their
investments in public infrastuctures shortly before the 2018 elections (IRIS 2018, p.20). From April
2015 to May 2015, Iraq faced, in fact, an exponential growth in night light shining (see Fig. 5).
This included not only areas on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, but also Baghdad, Hawija, Irbil,
Kirkuk, Mosul, Ramadi, Tal Afar and the Basrah area. The announced defeat of ISIS, the temporary
improvement of the security situation and the simoultaneuous occurence of the Holy Month of
Ramadan certainly played a  role  in  this  growth of prosperity shining,  though social  cooptation
activities implemented to increase electoral acceptance should also be mentioned as key factors for
improved war damage reconstruction and, subsequent, electricity usage. 
34 http://www.fao.org/iraq (accessed 19 May 2018). 
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Conclusion
As an important ecosystem, the Iraqi public governance architecture has been used as means to
ensure polity and policy loyalty (see Hirschman 1970, 1978). As is clear from the discussion above,
understanding ISIS' public governance evolutions, including processes of variation, as well as the
associated mechanisms of selection and replication of institutions and public governance practices
(Lewis and Steinmo 2012, p. 314) becomes necessary. 
However, at this stage it is still difficult to locate future Iraqi political and fiscal policies. In
absence of a clear involvement of citizens in financing their own system of democratic governance
(OECD 2016b), electoral requests become easily a gift of the political, or religious, elites to ‘their’
citizens (Diamond 2008). From an analytical point of view, it seems to be of interest to emphasize
the importance of public integrity (OECD 2017b). But, the next obstacle to good public governance
concerns the introduction of an effective tax-financing model, which remains an important means
for the implementation of de-commodification, de-stratification and de-clientelization strategies35.
As argued by Eaton (2018, p.2) for the case of Libya's war economy, a strategy of co-opting
networks of war economy profiteers has often been established. But failures in coercion capacity
have led to administrative, governance and security failures. The same observation holds true for
positive incentives which might increase instead of decreasing war-making and war-profiteering
activities, if co-optation activities are characterized by abuse, bad governance and corruption. The
profit  margins  of  war  economy beneficiaries  and militias  must,  however,  be  decreased.  Hence,
whilst  continuing  to  assure  that  people  are  not  being  exposed  to  harm,  danger  and  terror,
reconverting the tax finance system to more worthy causes involves a reconversion of the central
governance  architecture. This  implies the  necessity  of  ensuring  public  integrity  and  good
governance (see OECD 2017a,b) through new tax-farming and tax-steering mechanisms, which are
determinant to avoid state- and policy- capture (see also OECD 2016b). I call this, the “taxman
approach”.
Financing for a new political economy presupposes, in fact, that funds can be raised not only
through traditional forms of financing, such as direct and indirect taxation, but also through oil
revenues, profits from capital investment, as well as from foreign direct investments, official donor
assistance36,  remittances  (Cerami  and  Stubbs  2013),  and  private-public  partnerships.  The
35 On  de-commodification, de-stratification and de-clientelization strategies, see Esping-Andersen 
(1990) and Gought et al. (2001).
36 See OECD (2018). 
https://public.tableau.com/views/AidAtAGlance/DACmembers?:embed=y&:display_count=no?
&:showVizHome=no#1
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establishment  of  a  new  “fiscal  contract”  seems  necessary  also  to  address  the  “dictatorship
dilemma”, according to which dictators or religious Leviathans can foster their acceptance among
the population and electoral representation through new forms of social cooptation (see Genschel et
al.  2016).  Considering these circumstances,  the available data strongly suggest that the ways in
which “people  illuminate  the  night”  (Román  and  Stokes  2015)  and  their  life  will  be  strongly
correlated  to  the  positive  introduction  of  a  new fiscal  contract  and  new steering-mechanisms.
However, the new delivery capacity of Iraq's oil-led state-captured capitalism with associated oil-
led state-captured war-fare regime, including its new fiscal contract, must be seriously examined.
This  also  implies  taking  into  consideration  possible  positive  incentives  and  the  creation  of
unforeseen adverse social bondage activities.
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Fig. 1 Prosperity Shining Iraq 2012 SUOMI-NPP/VIIRS
Source: SUOMI-NPP VIIRS (2018). Available at: https://jointmission.gsfc.nasa.gov/viirs.html
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Fig. 2 Prosperity Shining Iraq 2016 SUOMI-NPP/VIIRS
Source: SUOMI-NPP VIIRS (2018). Available at: https://jointmission.gsfc.nasa.gov/viirs.html
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Fig. 3 Prosperity Shining Iraq March 9, 2017 SUOMI-NPP/VIIRS
Source: SUOMI-NPP VIIRS (2018). Available at: https://jointmission.gsfc.nasa.gov/viirs.html
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Fig. 4 Iraq Map  March 31, 2018 Prosperity Shining SUOMI-NPP/VIIRS
Source: SUOMI-NPP VIIRS (2018). Available at: https://jointmission.gsfc.nasa.gov/viirs.html
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Source: SUOMI-NPP VIIRS (2018). Available at: https://jointmission.gsfc.nasa.gov/viirs.html
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Source: AQUA AIRS (2018). Available at: https://aqua.nasa.gov/
37
Fig. 14 Carbon Monoxide+Nitrogen Dioxide March 31, 2018 AURA OMI and TERRA/MOPITT
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